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Abstract
Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) introduced the problem of classify-
ing the members of a group in terms of the opinions of their potential
members. This involves a finite set of agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, each
one having an opinion about which agents should be classified as be-
longing to a specific subgroup J . A Collective Identity Function (CIF)
aggregates those opinions yielding the class of members deemed J .
Kasher and Rubinstein postulate axioms, intended to ensure fair and
socially desirable outcomes, characterizing different CIFs. We follow
their lead by replacing their liberal axiom by other axioms, constrain-
ing the spheres of influence of the agents. We show that some of them
lead to different CIFs while in another instance we find an impossibil-
ity result.
Keywords: Group Identification; Social Choice; Decisiveness; Clas-
sification; Liberalism.
1 Introduction
People, countries and inanimate objects, among other entities, are custom-
arily classified in groups. Sometimes these classifications are simple and
obvious, as for instance organizing countries by the continent to which they
∗Carlos Pimienta (UNSW, Australia) and Alejandro Neme (UNSL, Argentina) provided
useful comments and criticisms on a previous version of this paper.
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belong. However, if we want to identify the members of a particular commu-
nity or, say, regroup countries in terms of their degree of “eco-friendliness”,
the classification is far from evident, and the assessment of the individuals or
nations involved matters for the final result. Kasher and Rubinstein (K-R)
analyzed this problem (“Who is a J?”, 1997), presenting it as a question of
defining appropriate aggregation functions over profiles of opinions. Each
person in a society is assumed to have an opinion about which individuals,
including theirself, may or not belong to the group. The opinion of an in-
dividual is thus identified with a subset of the class of all agents. Then, to
determine the identities of the individuals who will finally deemed to belong
to the group, the opinions of all the individuals are aggregated. There exist
many ways in which this aggregation can be carried out, each embodied in an
aggregator function, which they call a Collective Identity Function (CIF). K-
R characterize three different CIFs, each of which reflects a particular notion
of “fairness”. The “Liberal” CIF classifies as a J any individual that sees
theirself as being a member of J ; the “Dictatorial” CIF is such that a single
individual decides who is in J , and the “Oligarchic” one, in which this deci-
sion is made by a specific group of individuals. K-R’s original contribution
started a line of work extending and modifying it. So, for instance, Sapor-
iti (2012), modified K-R’s axioms; Sung and Dimitrov (2003, who provided
new characterizations; Cho and Ju (2016) that work on the identification of
two groups; Cho and Saporiti (2015), dealing with the incentive aspects of
declaring opinions on who belongs to J , and Fioravanti and Tohme´ (2019)
using an infinite setting of agents.
The axioms that K-R used are classical ones: Monotonicity (if an indi-
vidual i belongs already to J under some profile of opinions, if in another
profile there are more agents favoring their inclusion in J , i has to belong to
J in this new profile), Consensus (if everybody thinks i is in J then i must
be a J), Symmetry (if the number of agents that think that i belongs to J is
the same as that of those to think that j ∈ J , then either both or none are
in J) and Independence (only the opinions on whether i belongs or not to J
matter for determining if i is a J or not). These axioms are expected to be
satisfied by any “fair” aggregator.
K-R added to them a new axiom, the Liberal Principle, capturing a spe-
cific notion of “liberalism”, stating that if someone considers theirself a mem-
ber of J , then the set of J cannot be empty, while if someone considers their-
self not a member of J , then not everybody can be classified as a J . In this
paper we explore the consequences of replacing this axiom by four alterna-
tives axioms. In particular, three of our four axioms can be seen as opposed
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to liberalism. They give the power to agents to decide whether another agent
should or not belong to J . The fourth axiom, instead, is a stronger version
of K-R’s Liberal Principle.
First, we present an axiom that grants each agent the right to be decisive
on the question of whether another given individual belongs or not to J . A
weaker version of this axiom amounts to allowing at least two agents to de-
cide whether or not another particular agent belongs to the group. We prove
that the Strong Liberal CIF is the only CIF that verifies these two axioms.
The other axiom states that at least two agents can be semidecisive over two
other agents (i.e. the positive opinion on whether these agents belong to J
determines the actual social decision). In this case we find that there are
more CIFs verifying it.
These three axioms abstract away rules that are considered natural in
societies. For example, it is assumed that parents have the right to decide
which religious or ethnical allegiance they choose for their children. No ex-
ternal power can force them to give their children a particular identity.
Finally, we consider an extreme version of the Liberal Principle. It has
a positive part prescribing that if there is an agent that thinks that some
(possibly another) agent is in J , then someone must be a J . The negative
part prescribes that if there is an agent that thinks that there is another
agent who is not in J , then not everyone can be a J . This axiom can be
interpreted as indicating that at least some opinions actually matter. The
failure of this axiom could mean that some results are obtained against the
opinion of all the agents, a clear illiberal situation. We prove that there is no
CIF verifying the full version of this axiom, but we find uniqueness results
for two CIFs, one verifying its positive and the other its negative part.
This paper should not be interpreted in a normative sense. Our main goal
is to explore alternative axiomatizations and analyze the properties of the
ensuing aggregation functions (if they exist). Despite this purely technical
goal, we think that some of the axioms we introduce here can be seen as
highly stylized versions of spheres of individual decision-making permitted
in human societies. A word of caution is needed here: this paper is a pure
exercise of characterization of an axiomatic system. In this sense it is not
intended for any practical (i.e. normative) use. Its gist is both in the char-
acterization of CIFs and in the proofs of impossibility of satisfaction of a set
of axioms.
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We describe the original axioms in the next Section, while in Section 3 we
focus on the Strong Liberal CIF and obtain a characterization of the system
with the new set of axioms. The results on the relation with the extreme
version of liberalism are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Basic notation and axioms
We consider a set N of individuals, with | N |= n < ∞. Each individual i
has an “opinion” described by a set Ci ⊆ N . By a slight abuse of language
we will use J to denote a subset of N and a type of individual. With j ∈ Ci
we indicate that i thinks that j has to be classified as a J . On the contrary,
if j /∈ Ci, then i does not think that j should be a J . A profile of opinions
is a tuple C = (C1, . . . , Cn) where Ci ⊆ N for every i ∈ N . Let P (N) be
the power set of N and C the set of all possible profiles of opinions, i.e.,
C = P (N)n. By a further abuse of language we denote by J the Collective
Identity Function (CIF) J : C → P (N). That is, a CIF is a function that
assigns to each profile of opinions a set J ⊆ N , of the individuals that will
be socially considered to be J .
Let us now present the axioms introduced by K-R to capture properties that
a fair CIF should satisfy:
The first one states that if a CIF classifies i as a J , then having more people
considering i as a J will just reinforce i status. The same is true if the CIF
classifies an agent j as not being in J : if j “loses” votes, they keep being a
non-J .
• Monotonicity(MON): let i ∈ J(C) and C ′ be a profile identical to C
except that there are individuals i and k, such that i /∈ Ck and i ∈ C
′
k;
then i ∈ J(C ′). Analogously, if i /∈ J(C) and C ′ is identical to C,
except that there is a k such that if i ∈ Ck and i /∈ C
′
k, then i /∈ J(C
′).
The next axiom amounts to claim that if everybody thinks that i is a J , then
the CIF has to classify them as a J . On the other hand, if no one considers
that i is a J , then the CIF cannot allow them to be a J .
• Consensus(C): if j ∈ Ci for all i, then j ∈ J(C); if j /∈ Ci for all i,
then j /∈ J(C).
The axiom of Symmetry indicates that the aggregator does not classify any
two members of the society on any basis other than that embedded in the
profile of views. That is, if two agents are “similar”, the CIF must classify
them in the same way.
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• Symmetry(SYM): j and k are symmetric in a profile C if
(i) Cj − {j, k} = Ck − {j, k}
(ii) for all i ∈ N − {j, k}, j ∈ Ci iff k ∈ Ci
(iii) j ∈ Cj iff k ∈ Ck
(iv) j ∈ Ck iff k ∈ Cj
Then, j ∈ J(C) if and only if k ∈ J(C).
The final axiom ensuring a fair aggregation process indicates that to define
whether i is or not a J , a CIF must take into account only opinions about i.
• Independence(I): consider two profiles C and C ′ and let i be an in-
dividual in N . If for all k ∈ N , i ∈ Ck if and only if i ∈ C
′
k, then
i ∈ J(C) if and only if i ∈ J(C ′).1
Kasher and Rubinstein introduce another axiom to capture the idea that an
individual’s view of themself should be considered relevant.
• The Liberal Principle(L): if there exists an i ∈ N such that i ∈ Ci,
then J(C) 6= ∅; and if there exists an i ∈ N such that i /∈ Ci, then
J(C) 6= N .
That is, if someone thinks they are in J , then somebody must be a J , and if
someone thinks they are not in J , then not everyone can be a J .
There are some cases where our axioms may be more appropriate. For ex-
ample, in a classroom, where the opinion that a student has about themself
should not determine his standing. Of course, what one thinks about oneself
is relevant, but in a variety of cases others may be better judges of individual
traits. Moreover, the individuals that have the right to judge should have
also the right to determine the outcome. For example, suppose the situation
where a family is in an amusement park and wants to ride a rollercoaster. It
seems reasonable to assume that, the opinions of the children notwithstand-
ing, whether the little baby goes on the ride or not it is the parents’ decision
to make. Our axioms intend to capture this intuition.
We introduce the following definitions, which will be useful for the rest
of this work:
1In their work, K-R use this version to characterize the Dictatorship and Oligarchic
aggregator, and use a weaker version to characterize the Liberal aggregator. The latter
version ensures their results. We use only this definition because it is a standard one in
the Social Choice literature (Arrow, 1963; Rubinstein and Fishburn, 1986; Nicolas, 2007;
Cho and Ju, 2017).
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Definition 1. We say that i ∈ N is decisive over j ∈ N , if the following
is true: j ∈ Ci iff j ∈ J(C). On the other hand i ∈ N is semidecisive over
j ∈ N , if only one of the following is true: if j ∈ Ci then j ∈ J(C) or, if
j /∈ Ci, then j /∈ J(C).
It is clear that if an individual is decisive then is also semidecisive, while
the converse is not true.
The first axiom we introduce allows every agent to be decisive over some
other agent (possibly themself). The second and third axioms, are weaker
versions of the first one, allowing at least two agents to be decisive or semide-
cisive over some other (although they could be themselves) two agents.
Now we present the formal definitions of these three axioms, which ab-
stract away and generalize the aforementioned intuitions:
• Decisiveness(D): for each i ∈ N there exists a j ∈ N such that i is
decisive over j.
• Minimal Decisiveness(MD): there exist at least two distinct indi-
viduals, i and j, and two distinct individuals, k and l, such that i is
decisive over k and j is decisive over l.
• Minimal Semi-Decisiveness(MSD): there exist at least two distinct
individuals, i and j, and two distinct individuals, k and l, such that i
is semidecisive over k and j is semidecisive over l.
The remaining axiom is an extreme version of the Liberal Principle used
by K-R. It states the impossibility of J = ∅, if somebody thinks that there
exists at least one individual who should be classified as a J . Similarly, if
there is some individual that thinks that there exists someone who is not a
J , then not everybody can be considered to be a J . That is, a single positive
opinion is enough to indicate that in fact some J exists and a single negative
opinion suffices to ensure that there exist at least one non-J . These two
principles seem very natural in liberal societies in which some people can
make decisions on behalf of others (parents for their children, teachers for
their students, etc.).
• Extreme Liberalism(EL):
(i) There exists a pair {i, j} ⊆ N such that if j ∈ Ci, then J 6= ∅.
(ii) There exists a pair {i, j} ⊆ N such that if j /∈ Ci, then J 6= N .
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3 Strong Liberal CIF
Kasher and Rubinstein introduce in their work the following CIF:
StL(C) = {i : i ∈ Ci}
This aggregator classifies as a J every agent that considers theirself a J . They
characterize this CIF as the only one that satisfies (MON), (C), (SYM), (I)
and (L). Sung and Dimitrov (2003) refine this result, and give a characteri-
zation of the Strong Liberal CIF as the only CIF that verifies (SYM), (I) and
(L). Because of its uniqueness, they conclude that if a CIF verifies (SYM),
(I) and (L) then it also verifies (MON) and (C). In this section, we change
the axiom (L) for (D), (MD) or (MSD), and explore which CIFs verify them.
We think of (D) as a new axiom capturing an opposite notion of liberalism
than (L).
The next example shows that if a CIF satisfies (L) it does not necessarily
verify (D).
Example 1. Let J(C) = S ∈ P (N) for all C ∈ C with S /∈ {∅, N}. This
CIF verifies (L) because its outcome is neither the empty set nor the entire
group. And it does not verify (D). Suppose 1 is decisive over 2 and S = {1, 2}.
If C = ({1}, {2}), then J(C) = {1, 2}, contradicting that 1 is decisive over
2.
Another example shows that (D) does not imply (L).
Example 2. Suppose N = {1, 2} and J is a CIF such that 1 is decisive over
2 and 2 decisive over 1. It verifies (D) because every agent is decisive over
the other agent. It does not verify (L) because J({1}, {2}) = ∅ even if i ∈ Ci
for i = 1, 2.
Although that it seems that (L) and (D) capture opposite notions, the
uniqueness of the Strong Liberal CIF is still valid when we replace one for
the other. Even more, we can drop one of the axioms to show this:
Theorem 1. For N such that |N | > 2, the only CIF that verifies (SYM)
and (D) is the Strong Liberal CIF.2
Proof. First, we show that two agents cannot be decisive over the same agent.
Suppose, on the contrary, that i and j are decisive over k. If in the profile
C, we have k ∈ Ci and k /∈ Cj, then i ∈ J(C) and i /∈ J(C), a contradiction.
Since we assume that the group of voters is finite, for every CIF that satisfies
2When |N | = 2, we find in Example 2 a CIF that verifies (SYM) and (D).
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(D), any agent can be decisive over just one agent. Let σ be a permutation
of the set N of individuals. If a CIF verifies that every agent is decisive over
any other agent (including themself), it must have the following form:
Jσ(C) = {σ(i) : σ(i) ∈ Ci}
If σ is the identity permutation we obtain the Strong Liberal CIF, satisfying
both axioms.
Now consider a permutation σ such that σ(i) 6= i for some i. Suppose that
Jσ satisfies (SYM). Then, for every possible profile (C1, . . . , CN), if there
exists a pair j, k of symmetric individuals, either {j, k} ⊆ Jσ(C) or {j, k} *
Jσ(C). Consider a simple example in which N = {1, 2, 3} and σ = (23)
(the permutation that exchanges 2 and 3, leaving 1 fixed). Consider the
profile C = ({3}, {1, 3}, {1}). Agents 1 and 3 are symmetric. By definition
Jσ(C) = {3}, but according to (SYM) it should be that 1 ∈ Jσ(C) if and
only if 3 ∈ Jσ(C). Contradiction. This shows that the CIF verifies (D) but
not (SYM).
Since the StL CIF verifies (MON), (C) and (I), the following corollary
can be obtained immediately from Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. If a CIF satisfies (SYM) and (D), it also verifies (MON), (C)
and (I).
Furthermore, we can get a refinement of this result.
Proposition 1. If a CIF verifies (D), it also verifies (MON), (C) and (I).
Proof. Suppose j is decisive over i.
• (D) implies (MON). If we have i ∈ J(C), then it must be the case that
i ∈ Cj . Consider a profile C
′ identical to C except that there is an
individual k such that i /∈ Ck and i ∈ C
′
k. There is no change in the
opinion of j, so by (D) we have that i ∈ J(C ′). The same happens if
i /∈ J(C).
• (D) implies (C). If i ∈ Ck for all k ∈ N , in particular it is true that
i ∈ Cj. So by (D), we have i ∈ J(C). If i /∈ Ck for all k ∈ N , we have
that, in particular i /∈ Cj . Again, by (D) we have i /∈ J(C).
• (D) implies (I). Let C,C ′ ∈ C be two profiles such that for all k ∈ N ,
i ∈ Ck if and only if i ∈ C
′
k. If we have that i ∈ J(C), then it must be
the case that i ∈ Cj, so i ∈ C
′
j . Then by (SL) we have i ∈ J(C
′). The
same happens if i /∈ J(C).
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An example illustrates that (SYM) does not imply any of the other ax-
ioms:3
Example 3. Define the following CIF:
J(C) =


StL(C) if StL(C ) ∈ {∅, N}
N − StL(C) otherwise
This CIF verifies (SYM), but not (MON), (C), (I) and (D).
Minimal Decisiveness is a weaker version of Decisiveness, since it only
requires that at least two agents must be decisive. In the proof of Theorem 1,
we do not make any reference to the number of agents who are decisive. So
weakening the axiom does not change the result. We obtain the following:
Corollary 2. The only CIF that verifies (SYM) and (MD) is the Strong
Liberal CIF.
The results from Corollary 1 and Proposition 1 remain the same if we
replace (D) by (MD).
We give two examples of CIF’s that will be useful in the future.4 The Una-
nimity (U ) CIF, that prescribes that i is a J if and only if everybody thinks
that i is a J . Formally:
U(C) = {i : i ∈ Ck for all k ∈ N}
And the Inclusive (In) CIF, that indicates that i is a J if someone thinks
that i is a J :
In(C) = {i : i ∈ Ck for some k ∈ N}
Minimal Semi-Decisiveness is weaker than Minimal Decisiveness, since it only
requires that at least two agents must be semidecisive. When we use such a
weak notion, we find more CIFs that satisfy (SYM) and (MSD). Moreover,
they also verify (MON), (C) and (I):
Proposition 2. The Strong Liberal CIF is not the only CIF that verifies
(MON), (C), (SYM), (I) and (MSD).
3This example is used in Sung and Dimitrov (2003) to introduce a CIF that verifies
(SYM) and (L) but not (I).
4Samet and Schmeidler (2003) defines this as consent rules. In particular, the U CIF
is the consent rule where s = n and t = 1, and the In CIF is the consent rule where s = 1
and t = n.
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Proof. It is clear that the Strong Liberal CIF verifies the proposed axioms.
The U and In are two examples. Both CIFs satisfy all the axioms. With U ,
every agent is semidecisive since, if i /∈ Cj for some j ∈ N , then i /∈ U(C).
With In, every agent is semidecisive since, if i ∈ Cj for some j ∈ N , then
i ∈ In(C).
4 Extreme Liberalism
Let us recall the definition of this axiom:
Extreme Liberalism(EL):
(i) If there exists a pair {i, j} ⊆ N such that j ∈ Ci, then J 6= ∅.
(ii) If there exists a pair {i, j} ⊆ N such that j /∈ Ci, then J 6= N .
From the definitions, we can see that (EL) implies (L). The idea that (EL)
captures, is that if someone thinks that there is at least one J , then the group
of socially accepted people cannot not be empty. Similarly, if somebody
thinks that some individual is not a J , then not everybody can be a J .
The Liberal Principle (L) captures the idea that the opinion about oneself
is important. (EL) goes further, stating that the opinion of any individual
about somebody else matters. When we turn to such an extreme concept of
“liberalism”, we obtain an impossibility result. This is easy to see from the
fact that (EL) implies (L) and the Strong Liberal CIF does not verify (EL).
Beside this issue, we can show the uniqueness of CIFs that satisfy parts (i)
and (ii) of (EL) separately.
Theorem 2. The Inclusive CIF In is the only CIF that verifies (MON), (C),
(I) and (EL)(i).5
Proof. First of all, notice that In satisfies these four axioms. Consider a
different CIF J that also verifies them. Suppose that there is a profile C
such that i ∈ Ck for some k but i /∈ J(C). By applying (MON) several
times, we can find a profile C ′ identical to C with the exception that for
every j 6= k, i /∈ C ′j so that i /∈ J(C
′). Let C ′′ be the profile such that
C ′′k = {i} and C
′′
j = ∅ for all j 6= k. By (C), J(C
′′) cannot include any
individual from N − {i}. So J(C ′′) ∈ {∅, {i}}. Because this CIF satisfies
part (i) of (EL), it follows that J(C ′′) 6= ∅ and thus, J(C ′′) = {i}. But we
obtain a contradiction with (I), because agent i is treated in the same way in
profiles C ′ and C ′′ but i /∈ J(C ′) and i ∈ J(C ′′). Then, there does not exist
a CIF other than the Inclusive CIF satisfying the axioms.
5The Inclusive CIF In is defined in Section 3.
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On the other hand, we have that we need all the axioms to characterize
the In CIF:
Proposition 3. The Inclusive CIF is not the only CIF satisfying three out
of the four axioms (MON), (C), (I) and (EL)(i).
Proof. The proof consists of 4 examples, each of which presents a CIF satis-
fying exactly three of the four axioms and none of these CIFs is the Inclusive
one.
• Consider the CIF J(C) = {i : 0 < |{k|i ∈ Ck}| <
|N |
2
or |{k : i ∈
Ck}| = N}. That is, individuals are deemed to be J either if they are
considered to be J by less than half of all the individuals or if everybody
agrees on that they are J . This CIF does not satisfy (MON) because
if an agent i that is already a J obtains more votes, eventually can
exceed |N |
2
votes without requiring the approval of all the agents in N .
• The CIF J(C) = N for all C ∈ C satisfies all the axioms except (C).
Suppose that it satisfies (C) and 1 /∈ Ci for all i ∈ N . Then by (C),
1 /∈ J(C) = N , a contradiction.
• Consider the following CIF defined inductively. Let J(C, 0) be the
set of all individuals for which there is a consensus in C on that they
are J . Expand the set inductively by adding, at the t-th stage, those
members for whom there is a consensus among J(C, t − 1) that they
are J . In the case that J(C, 0) = ∅ we define J(C) = {i : |{k|i ∈
Ck}| ≥ 1}. This CIF verifies all the axioms except (I). Consider for
example the profiles C = ({1}, {2}, {3}) and C ′ = ({1, 2}, {2}, {2, 3}).
Thus J(C) = {1, 2, 3}, but J(C ′) = J(C ′, 0) = J(C ′, 1) = {2}. Then
(I) is not satisfied for agent 1.
• The Strong Liberal CIF satisfies all the axioms except (EL)(i). For ex-
ample, consider the profile C = ({2}, {1}). Then StL(C) = ∅ violating
(EL)(i).
We have a similar uniqueness result when we use part (ii) of (EL).
Theorem 3. The Unanimity CIF U is the only CIF that verifies (MON),
(C), (I) and (EL)(ii).6
6Again, see Section 3 for the definition of U .
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Proof. Clearly U satisfies these four axioms. Consider a different CIF J that
also verifies them. Suppose there is a profile C such that i /∈ Ck for some
k but i ∈ J(C). By applying (MON) several times, we can find a profile
C ′ identical to C with the exception that for every j 6= i, i ∈ C
′
j so that
i ∈ J(C ′). Let C
′′
be the profile such that for every j ∈ N−{k}, C
′′
j = N and
C
′′
k = N−{i}. By (C), N−{i} ⊆ J(C
′′). So J(C ′′) ∈ {N−{i}, N}. Because
this CIF satisfies part (ii) of (EL), it is not possible that J(C ′′) = N , so we
have J(C ′′) = N − {i}. Again, we obtain a contradiction with (I), because
agent i is treated in the same way in profiles C ′ and C ′′ but i ∈ J(C ′) and
i /∈ J(C ′′). Then, there does not exist a CIF other than the Unanimity CIF
satisfying the axioms.
We have, as with the In CIF, that axioms are independent in the char-
acterization of the U CIF:
Proposition 4. The Unanimity CIF is not the only CIF that verifies three
out of the four axioms (MON), (C), (I) and (EL)(ii).
Proof. The proof consists again of 4 examples, each of which satisfies exactly
three of the four axioms and none is the Unanimity CIF.
• Consider the CIF that first defines as J the agents for whom there is
a consensus in the profile C that they are J . If this group is empty
and C1 6= N , then J(C) = {i : i ∈ C1 and i /∈ Ck for all k 6=
1}. If C1 = N then J(C) = ∅. This CIF verifies all the axioms
except (MON). Consider the profile C = ({1}, {2}, {3}). Then J(C) =
{1}. Now suppose that agent 1 receives one vote more, as in C ′ =
({1}, {1, 2}, {3}). We have J(C ′) = ∅. So (MON) is not verified.
• Consider the following CIF defined inductively. Let J(C, 0) be the
set of all individuals for which there is a consensus that they are J
in C. Expand the set inductively by adding, at the t-th stage, those
members for whom there is a consensus among J(C, t − 1) that they
are J . In the case that J(C, t) = N for some t > 0, we define J(C) =
{i : |{k|i ∈ Ck}| = N}. This CIF verifies all the axioms except (I).
Consider for example the profiles C = ({1, 2}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}) and C ′ =
({1, 2}, {1, 2}, {3}). J(C) = J(C ′, 1) = {1, 2} while J(C ′) = ∅. Then
(I) is not satisfied for agent 2.
• The examples for (C) and (EL)(ii) are analogous to the ones used in
the proof of Proposition 3.
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From the uniqueness of the In and U CIFs we obtain the following result:
Corollary 3. If a CIF verifies (MON), (C), (I) and (EL)(i) or (MON), (C),
(I) and (EL)(ii); then it verifies (SYM).
5 Conclusions
In this work we deal with the group identification problem and consider al-
ternatives axioms to replace the liberal axiom used by K-R. When we replace
their liberal axiom by other axioms, some of which could be considered “il-
liberal”, while another one could be seen as an extreme version of liberalism,
we obtain some unique characterizations as well as an impossibility result.
There are many settings in which these alternative axioms can be meaning-
fully applied, particularly when we consider the spheres of decision allowed in
liberal societies, which usually involve other individuals (children, students,
etc.)
Our first result (Theorem 1) can be interpreted as indicating that when we
allow at least two of the individuals to be decisive about their own identity or
that of another specific agent, a unique rule satisfies all the proposed axioms.
Furthermore, this rule allows them to be decisive only over themselves. The
only CIF that satisfies this is the Strong Liberal CIF, the aggregator that K-R
characterize in their work. The interesting thing is that this condition implies
many other notions generally required to be satisfied by a “fair” aggregator.
When we want a CIF to satisfy Decisiveness, we also obtain that this CIF
verifies Monotonicity, Consensus and Independence. A social planner then
knows that if she wants to implement this notion, it will come associated to
those other properties. Proposition 2 shows that if we only allow the agents
to be semidecisive over a specific agent (which could be himself), we find
more rules satisfying all the axioms. That is, when we weaken the Decisive-
ness axiom, other rules can be chosen. Finally, when the opinion of any agent
is enough to ensure that the class of J individuals is not the empty set nor
the entire society, as it is asked in Extreme Liberalism, no rule will satisfy
all the axioms. The only possibility is to have two different CIFs, satisfying
each of them only one part of this concept.
Another interesting aspect, is that the Strong Liberal CIF proposed by K-R,
is the only one that verifies opposite axioms such as Liberalism and Decisive-
ness. This gives an idea of the power that this CIF has. As in K-R, the idea
here is not to find “the appropriate method” for defining the members of a
group. On the contrary, the goal is just to examine as thoroughly possible
all the logical aspects of the problem. The axioms presented here should
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thus not be understood in normative terms, but just as an exploration of al-
ternative notions, somewhat close to some intuitions on what some societies
allow.
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